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Abstract
We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and
played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to
Rubinstein’s [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the
behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected
utility maximizers.
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1. Introduction
Nash’s (1950) axiomatic model of two-person bargaining assumes that the players
have expected utility preferences. Several other papers have shown, however, that the
axiomatic bargaining theory can be extended to allow for some non-expected utility
1 preferences. Within the strategic approach, the early models do not involve risk
preferences but time preferences. Binmore et al. (1986) show, however, that a
bargaining game of alternating offers and exogenous risk of breakdown is formally
equivalent to the bargaining model with time preferences, at least when players
preferences satisfy the expected utility axioms.
Extending a noncooperative bargaining model to non-expected utility preferences
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requires some modeling choices. Since a pair of strategies induces a compound lottery
over terminal histories, one needs to decide what kind of preferences over compound
lotteries to allow. Segal (1990) showed that if one is to leave the expected utility model,
then one needs to drop either the compound independence axiom or the reduction of
compound lotteries axiom. Both axioms are appealing and none of them appears to be a
clear choice at ﬁrst sight. Both approaches have been used in the past, in the context of
strategic form games. Crawford (1990) introduces the notion of equilibrium in beliefs,
which coincides with the Nash equilibrium concept under the expected utility hypoth-
esis. He adopts the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and shows conditions under
which an equilibrium in beliefs does exist in a game. Dekel et al. (1991) adopt the
compound independence axiom and show that under certain conditions a Nash
equilibrium exists in every strategic form game. Volij (1996) extends Aumann and
Brandenburger’s (1995) results on epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium both for
the case when preferences satisfy compound independence and the reduction axiom.
In the context of extensive form games, compound independence seems to be more
appealing than the reduction axiom because it guarantees that players’ behavior is
dynamically consistent, a property that is vacuous in static games. The dynamic
inconsistency of a player’s behavior has serious consequences for existence of subgame
perfect equilibrium: in some ﬁnite games subgame perfect equilibria may fail to exist.
This is due to the fact that when players behave in a dynamically inconsistent way, the
one deviation property does not hold in general. Having said that, the two-person
bargaining model where players’ preferences satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries
axiom does have a subgame perfect equilibrium, which was characterized by Burgos et
al. (2002).
In this paper we extend Binmore et al. (1986) result to preferences that satisfy the
compound independence axiom. In fact we show that under this assumption, and within
the noncooperative bargaining model, the resulting preferences are indistinguishable
from expected utility ones. Therefore all the results known about the bargaining model
of alternating offers are robust to changes in the risk preferences, as long as these
preferences satisfy the compound independence axiom.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst brieﬂy describe Rubinstein’s (1982) game
of alternating offers with a constant risk of breakdown. We complete the description of
the game by concentrating on a small class of compound lotteries and restricting
preferences over that class to satisfy several properties, compound independence being
the crucial one. We make a short detour and show that without compound independence
the one deviation property may fail, and thus subgame perfect equilibrium may fail to
exist even in ﬁnite games.We then go back to the analysis of the game and prove that it
is equivalent to the standard Rubinstein game with time preferences and no risk of
breakdown. We end with a remark on the generality of the bargaining model with
non-expected utility preferences.
2. Rubinstein’s game of alternating offers with a constant risk of breakdown
There are two players and a perfectly divisible object of size 1. The possible divisions
of the object are thus given byO. Volij / Mathematical Social Sciences 44 (2002) 17–24 19
2 X 5h(x , x )[K : x 1x 51j. (1) 12 1 12
Consider the following game form. Players alternate in making proposals from the set X.
After a proposal is made by one player, the other player responds by either accepting or
rejecting it. If the offer is accepted, the game ends and the accepted proposal is
implemented. If the proposal is rejected, then with a ﬁxed probability 12d the game
ends and the division is (0, 0), and with probability d the game continues with a new
proposal made by the previous responder. A strategy for player i 51, 2 is a speciﬁcation
of a feasible action for every node at which player i is called to play. That is, when i is
supposed to propose, the strategy speciﬁes an element of X and when i is supposed to
respond to a proposal x [X, a strategy speciﬁes whether or not to accept x. Strategies
are not restricted to be stationary. A strategy proﬁle is a pair s 5(s , s ) of strategies, 12
one for each player. A pair of strategies uniquely determines a compound lottery.
Therefore, in order to deﬁne the players’ preferences over lotteries on terminal histories
and thus complete the deﬁnition of the game, it is enough to deﬁne their preferences
over compound lotteries. Further, since the set of strategy proﬁles induces only a small
set of compound lotteries over X, it is enough to deﬁne the players’ preferences only on
that small space of lotteries.
2.1. Compound lotteries
An elementary lottery over a set Z is deﬁned to be a lottery that awards an element
z [Z with probability p, and (0, 0) with the complementary probability.We denote such
a lottery by kz, pl. As a consequence, the set of elementary lotteries over X, or one-stage
lotteries, is given by
1 L 5hkx, pl: x [X, p [[0, 1]j. (2)
1 For each division x [X we identify x with kx,1 l[L . We now deﬁne compound
lotteries over X, recursively, as follows: for all n 52 , 3 ,..., a n n-stage lottery is an
elementary lottery over the set of (n 21)-stage lotteries. Formally,
nn 21 n21 n21 L 5hk, , pl: , [L , p [[0, 1]j n 52,3, .... (3)
The set of ﬁnite compound lotteries is then
` n L5 < L . (4)
n51
We shall represent the n-stage lottery , 5k ...kkx, p l, p l,...,p l more succinctly by 12 n
nn n 11 kx,( p ) l. We can, thus, think of any lottery , [L as a point in R with its kk 51
associated Euclidean topology.
There are strategy pairs, s, that induce ﬁnite compound lotteries. Note that these
t lotteries are of the form , 5k ...kkx, dl, dl,..., dl5kx,( d) l[L. There are strategy k51
pairs, on the other hand, that do not induce a ﬁnite compound lottery but an inﬁnite one.
For example a pair of strategies that induces eternal rejection of the proposed divisions,
induces an inﬁnite compound lottery. We shall denote this inﬁnite compound lottery by
D. Note that D is the only inﬁnite lottery that can be induced in this game.20 O. Volij / Mathematical Social Sciences 44 (2002) 17–24
Player i 51,2 is supposed to have a preference relation K over elements of L<hDj, i
that satisfy the following properties:
A1. No agreement is worse than disagreement. For all , [L, ,K D. i
A2. Compound independence. For all ,, ,9[L and for all p [[0, 1], ,K ,9 if and i
only if k,, plK k,9, pl. i
A3. Monotonicity. For all x [X and p [[0, 1], xKkx, pl. For all x, y [X and i 51, 2,
if x .y then x s y. ii i
ks 9 A4. Continuity. If for all n [N and for some ﬁxed k and s, , [L and , [L are nn
k 99 such that , K , , and both h, j converges to , [L and h, j converges to ni n n n
s ,9[L , then ,K ,9. i
The ﬁrst requirement is a standard requirement in bargaining theory. Monotonicity is
monotonicity with respect to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. Continuity is a standard
technical requirement. The most important property is compound independence, which
imposes dynamic consistency on the players’ behavior. Compound independence is
convincingly advocated for in Segal (1990). Dekel et al. (1991) use this approach to
show existence of Nash equilibrium in normal form games where players are not
expected utility maximizers. Further, it can be shown that provided players satisfy
compound independence, all ﬁnite extensive form games with chance moves satisfy the
one-deviation property and thus Kuhn’s theorem extends to this larger domain (see
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, pp. 98–99) for the statements and proofs of the
one-deviation property and Kuhn’s theorem).
It should be noted that compound independence does not impose any restriction on
risk preferences over simple lotteries. In particular, consider the preferences deﬁned as
follows. Let v be an arbitrary continuous and increasing real function that maps [0,
n 1]3[0, 1] into [0, 1]. Say that compound lottery kx,( p ) l is at least as good as ii 51
m compound lottery ky,( q ) l if and only if v(...v(v(x , p ), p ) ,...,p )$ jj 511 1 2 n
v(...v(v(y , q ), q ) ,...,q ). It can be checked that these preferences satisfy 11 2 m
compound independence, monotonicity and continuity.
The following claim states that compound independence is a necessary condition for
subgame perfect equilibrium to be a non-empty solution concept for ﬁnite extensive-
form games.
Claim 1. If preferences do not satisfy compound independence one can build ﬁnite
extensive form games with chance moves that have no subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The reason for the nonexistence of a subgame perfect equilibrium is that when
preferences do not satisfy compound independence, even ﬁnite games need not have the
one-deviation property. To see this, assume that K are continuous preferences that do
not satisfy compound independence. Then there are outcomes y, z [X and probabilities
p, q [(0, 1) such that either
• y skz, pl but kkz, pl, qlsky, ql or
• kz, plsy but ky, qlskkz, pl, ql.O. Volij / Mathematical Social Sciences 44 (2002) 17–24 21
Fig. 1. An extensive game form.
In the ﬁrst case, let x [X be an outcome such that kkz, pl, qlsx sky, ql and
consider the game induced by the one-person game form of perfect information and
chance moves depicted in Fig. 1.
This game has two subgames: the game itself and the proper subgame that begins at
the second decision node. Since a subgame is a game, preferences in the proper subgame
are deﬁned accordingly: each strategy in the proper subgame induces a compound lottery
and the player’s preferences over strategies are those induced by his preferences over
compound lotteries. The backward induction strategy is deﬁned inductively: it dictates at
the root of each subgame the action that induces the best compound lottery given that in
the subsequent nodes play follows the backward induction strategy.
It is easy to see that the backward induction strategy is for the player to choose L at
both nodes (because y skz, pl and x sky, ql). However, the strategy that dictates to
choose R at both nodes is a proﬁtable deviation (because kkz, pl, qlsx). This means
that this game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the second case, let x [X
be an outcome such that ky, qlsx skkz, pl, ql and consider the game induced by the
same one-person game form of perfect information and chance moves depicted in Fig. 1.
It is easy to see that the backward induction strategy is for the player to choose L at the
ﬁrst node and R at the second node (because kz, plsy and x skkz, pl, ql). However,
the strategy that dictates to choose right at the ﬁrst node and left at the second node is a
proﬁtable deviation (because ky, qlskkz, pl, ql). This means that this game does not
have a subgame perfect equilibrium. h
The example in the above proof is similar to the results that appear in Green (1987)
and Wakker (1988), among others. All these papers exploit the dynamic inconsistency of
preferences that do not satisfy the compound independence axiom. Also, Claim 1 is
related to the discussions that appear in LaValle and Wapman (1986) and Sarin and
Wakker (1994) among others. It is shown there that the appropriateness of the
application of the folding back procedure to all the equivalent tree-representations of
acts, implies the independence axiom. In our case, an individual that satisﬁes compound22 O. Volij / Mathematical Social Sciences 44 (2002) 17–24
independence may well not satisfy the independence axiom. But this individual, when
evaluating an act, does not apply the folding back technique to all its tree representations
but only to one. Still, Claim 1 shows that compound independence is a necessary
property to guarantee that the folding back technique yields a subgame perfect
equilibrium in all ﬁnite extensive form games with chance moves.
It should be noted that Claim 1 does not imply that compound independence is a
necessary condition for a non trivial extensive game with chance moves to have a
subgame perfect equilibrium. In fact, Burgos et al. (2002) characterize the stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers game where preferences do not
necessarily satisfy the compound independence axiom and thus players may behave in a
dynamically inconsistent way.
2.2. Analysis of G(d)
Let d [(0, 1) and denote the bargaining game of alternating offers where the constant
risk of breakdown is d, and players’ preferences satisfy assumptions A1–A4, by G(d).
Proposition 1. Assume there is a unique pair of agreements x* and y* in X such that
kx*,dl| y* and ky*,dl| x*. (5) 12
Then G(d) has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which is the following: Player 1
always proposes x* and accepts proposal y [X if and only yK y*. Player 2 always 1
proposes y* and accepts proposal x [X if and only xK x*. 2
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that, given the properties of the players’
preferences, especially compound independence, the game G(d) is equivalent to the
game of alternating offers analyzed by Rubinstein (1982). To see this, note that each
t compound lottery , [L #L that can arise in G(d) can be uniquely associated to a pair
(x, t) where x [X and t is the number of stages in the compound lottery. And vice versa,
t each pair (x, t)[X 3T can be uniquely associated to the compound lottery kx,( d) l k51
in L. Therefore, any preference relation K over L<hDj induces a preference relation,
K9, over (X 3T)<hDj, where T 5h0 ,1 ,...j represents different time periods, in the
following manner:
ts (x, t)K9(y, s) ⇔ kx,( d) lKky,( d) l k51 k51
t (x, t)K9D ⇔ kx,( d) lKD. k51
It is not difﬁcult to check that the induced preference relation K9 satisﬁes the following
properties:
1. No agreement is worse than disagreement: (x, t)K9D for all (x, t)[X 3T.
2. Time is valuable: (x, t)K9(x, t 11) for every (x, t)[X 3T.
3. Preferences are stationary: (x, t)K9(y, t 11) if and only if (x,0 ) K9(y, 1) and (x,
t)K9(y, t) if and only if (x,0 ) K9(y,0).O. Volij / Mathematical Social Sciences 44 (2002) 17–24 23
4. Preferences are continuous: if x , y [X for all n [N, x → x [X and y → y [X nn n n
and (x , t)K9(y , t) for all n, then (x, t)K9(y, n). nn
Property 1 follows from the analogous property of K. Property 2 follows from
monotonicity and compound independence of K: by monotonicity we have that xKkx,
dl and by repeated applications of compound independence we have that kx,
tt 11 (d) lKkx,( d) l, which means precisely that (x, t)K9(x, t 11). Stationarity of k51 k51
preferences follows from repeated applications of compound independence and continui-
ty of K9 follows from continuity of K.
Therefore, the game G(d) is equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game of alternating
offers and time-preferences represented by K9: they have the same set of players, and
each player has the same strategy space and the same preferences over strategy proﬁles.
Since the game of alternating offers and time preferences given by K9 has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium, which is the one described in the statement of the
proposition (see Rubinstein, 1982), so does G(d). h
We can now state the following remark:
Remark 1. Within the alternating offers game G(d), the behavior of a player who’s
preferences satisfy A1–A4( in particular compound independence) is indistinguishable
from the behavior of an expected utility maximizer.
Proof. Since preferences over (X 3T)<hDj satisfy properties 1–4 in the above proof, it
follows from Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) that there are functions u : X → R , for i 1
i 51, 2, such that the auxiliary time-preferences can be represented by the utility
t function U (x, t)5u (x)d . But from Binmore et al. (1986) we know that the bargaining ii
game with these time-preferences is equivalent to a model whose players have von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions given by u , for i 51, 2. h i
As a result of the above remark, all the known results that assume expected utility
preferences extend to the case of preferences that satisfy compound independence. In
particular, the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of G(d)a sd goes to 1
is the ordinal Nash solution introduced in Rubinstein et al. (1992).
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